Aaron Brantly and Brooke Spens
Tech for Humanity Lab at Virginia Tech
Abstract:
Surveillance has been integral to criminological and intelligence studies literatures. In recent years surveillance technologies were used at all levels of analysis from the relational (actual or perceived) to the state and transnational levels. Importantly they are used against non-traditional targets, i.e. those who have not committed or are suspected of committing a crime, and those who fall outside of traditional intelligence targeting frameworks. Instead, these tools are increasingly used against civil society and human rights activists and journalists. Even within this subgrouping of targeted actors another prominent subgroup stands out, women. While there is a burgeoning literature on surveillance technologies at the relational level, there have been fewer analyses on the use of the technologies by states both domestically and transnationally to target women. The development and use of mobile malware including early attempts by the Hacking Team and more recent developments by the NSO Group have placed the proverbial crosshairs on women journalists and activists. Combined with data manipulation and distribution, the use of surveillance technologies to silence the voices of women is on the rise. This paper is a theory-building and mixed-methods exploratory study of gendered Pegasus targeting, supported by illustrative cases and a non-random public dataset.
Introduction
Surveillance has become increasingly ubiquitous in modern society. From cookies that follow users while they browse the internet to cameras that track the movement of citizens on the streets. Every move, every click, every action becomes data(Zuboff 2019) . While the pervasiveness of surveillance has grown and with it a level of comfort within the society at large, specialized surveillance technologies developed by private cyber intelligence firms have proliferated (Tau 2024). Tools developed by these firms have empowered states to reach into the most intimate spaces of those they wish to surveil(Ronald Deibert 2013) . The spyware developed by these firms has enabled states to access the mobile devices of their citizens in ways that undermine even the most conservative definitions of privacy (Zetter 2021) . Where once states employed human agents, wire taps, signals intercepts, and a bevy of other surveillance methodologies, they now turn to spyware (Brantly 2025). The result is the co-optation of communication and entertainment the tools that have become central to modern life, mobile phones. They use these conglomerations of sensors, data storage repositories, signal transmitters and receivers, and cameras to stealthily invade the lives of targets (Ron Deibert 2022) . Frequently these intrusions are not the result of improper security by the carrying individuals, because new forms of spyware, take advantage of vulnerabilities in the underlying operating systems and applications on devices to conduct zero-click attacks that do not require user interaction (Zetter 2021) .
Organizations like Amnesty International, Forbidden Stories, Human Rights Watch, and the Citizen Lab have drawn attention to the scale and scope of the use of spyware by states against human rights activists and journalists (Feldstein and Kot 2023). This paper’s analysis focuses on a subset of these victims, women. It examines how women are surveilled and asks: is the surveillance and subsequent use of data derived from the surveillance of women used differently than in comparable cases involving men? We hypothesize that while the data indicate that more men are surveilled, it is more likely that women targeted will be harassed through use of gender specific targeting including sexualization, familial ties or responsibilities, cultural or gendered behavioral patterns etc. (Anstis and LaFlèche 2024). This form of targeting seeks to circumvent addressing the concerns, ideas, or issues raised by women activists and instead seeks to discredit them through gendered constructs (Anstis and LaFlèche 2024). This paper develops a logic for why states focus on discrediting women through gendered constructs, examines the effectiveness of this approach, and the impact this approach has on women activists and journalists. Most importantly it asks the question: are gendered surveillance tactics more likely to be used against women than men?
The paper proceeds by examining the logic for surveillance against women rooted in both the surveillance literature and subsequently normative-feminist theory. The surveillance argument roots the state’s actions with concepts closely tied to regime survival. Subsequently, the normative-feminist theory approach then contextualizes why states take a gendered approach to women activists that diverges from similar tactics used against male activists. After building the logic that differentiates surveillance practices targeted against men and women, we provide four cases that highlight the gendered attributes of surveillance targeted against women. These four cases are not unique but are instead well-known representative cases that illustrate broader trends. Next, we discuss the impact of gender-based surveillance on women activists and their ability to mobilize, report, or otherwise engage in activities consistent with civil society activism. Finally, we conclude our analysis by drawing together our findings and highlighting the divergent trends in the conduct of surveillance by states against men and women.
What is surveillance and why do states surveil?
Surveillance is a complex concept imbued with both positive and negative attributes. Although this paper is principally concerned with the negative connotations of state surveillance, Dandeker (1990) notes that some surveillance arises out of the administrative needs of the state and the inextricably linked “bureaucratization of society.” Lyon (1994a) notes that administrative needs of the state are contextualized by Foucault who orients the discussion of surveillance towards the intrinsic nature of power, specifically the power to control. The power to control can be both good and bad. Yet it is the latter that is the focus of this paper. While good and bad are normative and fall along a sliding scale, we contextualize the concept of bad surveillance using Richard’s (2013) definition of bad surveillance as activities undertaken to constrain, undermine or “chill” the exercise of civil liberties. We expand this U.S. centric view on civil liberties to constitute activities undertaken by the state that through the systematic observation of people, places, or the collection of data on individuals or groups are undertaken principally to constrain, control, or otherwise undermine the human rights of individuals as outlined within the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Surveillance is used to constrain, undermine, or otherwise abrogate these rights broadly constitute inappropriate or illegal exertions of power by the state.
Lyon (1994b) writes that surveillance is “strongly bound up with our compliance with the current social order and can be a means of social control.” Where states have a strong rule of law including protections for human rights and civil liberties, where democratic norms and the interactions of the state and the citizenry are healthy, the conduct of surveillance against citizens operating within societal norms and laws is generally not necessary outside of criminal investigations. When the conditions defined above are not present friction arises between the citizenry and the state. Often this friction can only involve subsets of a population along religious, ethnic, social, economic, gender, sexual or political lines. Friction between the state and individuals or groups threatens the status quo and can challenge the power structure of the state or dominant population or political body. This can lead to conditions in which the state, defined as those in de jure and de facto control of the power structures fear for their survival. The need for control is rooted in a pervasive and powerful desire for regime survival (Ghodes 2024). In this context surveillance by a state is a rational policy that seeks to offset potential risks.
Surveillance is common in many countries around the world and can and has been used to silence dissidents and journalists (Priest, Mekhennet, and Bouvart 2021), contain collective action (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013), punish online expression (Garbe and Maerz 2026), constrain diaspora (Feldstein 2021) and more. The power of the state to exert control within and beyond borders is not new and the expansion of the repressive tendency of the state have been evolving for quite some time (Brantly 2022). The technical capacity of the state to surveil is increasingly expansive in scale and scope(Earl, Maher, and Pan 2022). It is also pervasive in its reach in ways that extend far beyond simply internet searches or street cameras. Surveillance blurs the lines between public and private and frequently invades the intimate (D. Citron 2022). What has emerged is an escalation of manipulation and control arising from digital tools that supercharge the surveillance capabilities of states (Garbe and Maerz 2026). State surveillance activities are increasingly broad, yet the most advanced forms of surveillance still require costly technologies and oversight. As a result, surveillance is both pervasive and targeted. It is both universal and gendered. Where it is gendered, the effects of surveillance on targets can be psychologically, socially, and professionally devastating (D. Citron 2022). The next section builds on the concept that states use surveillance against perceived threats and as a means of facilitating state survival, but it builds the hypothesis that the approach to surveillance, and the effect of surveillance are highly gendered and rooted in constructed norms on gender and social and cultural constructs.
A normative-feminist approach to gendered surveillance
Although much of the literature focuses on surveillance against activists and journalists broadly constituted and without regard to gender, there is an increasing realization that while surveillance and censorship are occurring and affecting both male and female activists, the reality is that the effects, while overlapping in some areas, do have distinct differences.These differences are best articulated within the context of feminist theory and the power structures – social, cultural, and political – identified within feminist scholarship. Beasley (Beasley 1999) identifies feminism as a “normative theory that seeks to eliminate the subordination, oppression, inequalities, and injustices women suffer because of their sex.” Moreover, as noted by Song (2005) the power structures of social and cultural order are often defined in the context of a society or state’s dominant norms and practices. Bell Hooks (Hooks 2000) notes that feminism is not anti-male but instead constitutes anti-patriarchal approach that seeks to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression. She further states that the goal of feminism as a movement is to challenge the systemic ideology of patriarchy (Hooks 1984) . Patriarchal power structures frequently constrain the lives of women in ways often not captured by more secular analytical frameworks (Andrews 2003). More explicitly surveillance affecting the lives (bodies) of women often falls within legal frameworks developed by men (MacKinnon 2005). These laws and often by extension social and cultural norms establish control over the actions, activities, and visibility of women within the state (Megarry 2018) .
Although online spaces were thought to be spaces of liberation (Diamond 2010), the reality indicates the opposite (Megarry 2014; Henshaw 2024). Patriarchal power structures have been grafted into the code, infrastructure, and behaviors exhibited in online environments. The result is that gendered surveillance practices take on both gender essentialist (Witt 2011) and socially constructed dimensions (Lorber 1994), with all the inherent contradictions that this implies. We hypothesize that states will tailor surveillance activities against women through essentialist and/or socially constructed views of women based on patriarchally defined societal power structures. The manifestation of this targeting is likely to be different from the targeting of heteronormative men. Specifically, we expect that states will focus on essentialist or socially constructed normative qualities in a manner that the state deems will cause the most harm to the reputation of the surveilled women or in some instances their partners. We define gendered targeting as a surveillance-enabled or surveillance-associated tactic that weaponizes gendered social norms, sexual reputation, intimate relationships, family roles, or gendered legal/institutional vulnerabilities to punish, deter, discredit, or coerce the victim.
Tactics targeting reputational harm are activities that make the body and acts conducted legal or illegal because of nonconsensual surveillance (Nakamura 2015) . These acts are constitutive of technology-facilitated sexual or gender-based violence and harassment and fall along a spectrum of abuse (Henry and Powell 2015). As will be demonstrated in the case analysis in the next section the gendered targeting of women consists of a variety of characteristics.
As our case analyses and data below will indicate, surveillance directed at women is frequently qualitatively different although national cultural and power structures result in variation. Within our limited data sample, we have identified four different methods of gendered surveillance including: (1) family-as-leverage (2) sexualized smear or morality attack; (3) intimate imagery exposure or blackmail and (4) gendered legal weaponization.
These tactics are not limited to women, yet as we will show through the cases and subsequent data analysis, there is reason to believe that these tactics disproportionately impact women.
Analyzing Four Cases of Gendered Surveillance
This section provides a detailed analysis of four cases in which states used surveillance technologies to target women in ways that differ from equivalent cases in which men were targeted. While two of the four cases are from Azerbaijan, the cases are each representative of broader attributes of gendered surveillance phenomenon.
Sexualized Blackmail – Khadija Ismayilova
The most well-documented case of gendered targeting is that of renowned Azerbaijani journalist Khadija Ismayilova. Ismayilova faced an onslaught of digital harassment and intimate surveillance tactics beginning in 2012 for herinvestigative reporting on corruption in the Azerbaijani government (Amnesty International 2014). While Ismayilova was investigating the Azerbaijani ruling family, she received a letter containing explicit images of her engaging in sexual activities with her partner, accompanied by a threat reading “Whore, refrain from what you are doing, otherwise you will be shamed” (D. K. Citron 2022) . Videos of Ismayilova engaging in sexual acts captured through cameras concealed in her personal bedroom were subsequently posted online following her refusal to discontinue the investigation (D. K. Citron 2022). No police investigation was conducted to identify the origin of the nonconsensual release of the sex tapes. News outlets labeled her immoral and a foreign agent in attempts to discredit her and her “anti-government” reporting. Commenting on her portrayal of in Azerbaijani media, Ismayilova said “Every day my picture is shown on TV [followed] with ridiculous claims of betrayal of the motherland, serving foreign powers and Armenians … Sometimes I feel they just use my face as a filler on TV. Whenever there is a talk of traitors, they just show my face, without even mentioning my name” (Lomsadze 2019). In 2014, Ismayilova was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities and spent more than two years in jail. Upon her release, she faced a travel ban forcing her to remain in the country for five years (Coll 2021). The reprisals did not end there. In 2021, Khadija Ismayilova was informed that her phone had been continually targeted with Pegasus spyware between March 2019 and May 2021 (Papademetriou 2023). The zero-click spyware developed by the Israeli firm NSO Group can access mobile devices’ contacts, text messages, camera, and audio features without user interaction(Avetisyan 2023). The malicious co-optation of Ismayilova’s mobile device revealed thousands of communications and sensitive information shared between Ismayilova and her surrounding personal and professional network, a breach that could severely hinder her professional work and wellbeing (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). Despite more than a decade of invasive digital targeting and being the subject of a deeply personal blackmail campaign in attempts to silence her voice, Ismayilova has continued reporting. Khadija Ismayilova brought a case under Article 8 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Humans Rights (ECHR) against an Azerbaijani prosecutor for violating her right to privacy and freedom of expression following the filming and release of the sex videos (D. K. Citron 2022). In 2020, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that while the nonconsensual filming and blackmail of Ismayilova was a grave intrusion of her privacy and an attempt to chill her speech, evidence was lacking to hold the Azerbaijani government responsible as the alleged perpetrators. The Azerbaijani government was fined for failing to adequately investigate the release explicit videos of Ismayilova and the associated blackmail note (D. K. Citron 2022). In January 2026, the ECtHR ruled that Azerbaijan had prosecuted Ismayilova as retaliation for her journalism and ordered the country to pay Ismayilova 4,000 euros for legal costs and 12,000 euros for moral damages (CPJ 2026). The recent ruling by ECtHR represents a small step towards recognizing the harm inflicted by surveillance technologies, and the damaging uses of the data collected and weaponized against women journalists. Analytically, Ismayilova’s case illustrates intimate imagery exposure and sexualized morality attack: surveillance-derived or surveillance-associated intimate material was transformed into a public reputational weapon intended to silence investigative journalism.
Proxy targeting – Carmen Aristegui
Carmen Aristegui is a prominent Mexican investigative journalist, and her case serves as an early example of digital surveillance technologies being leveraged to invade the private lives of members of civil society. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported Mexico to be the deadliest country for journalists in the Western Hemisphere, yet reporting indicates targeting tactics extend beyond the physical realm to include digital attacks (Guterl et al. 2022). Carmen Aristegui is the founder of Aristegui Noticias, an independent Mexican news organization known for investigative reporting and political coverage (“Aristegui Noticias” n.d.) The platform conducted high-profile investigative journalism exposing corruption in the Mexican government, spearheading investigations spanning favoritism in government contracting to pedophilia and prostitution connected to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) ruling party (“Aristegui Noticias” n.d.). One well-known investigation is the Aristegui Noticias exposure of “Casa Blanca.” The Casa Blanca, or “White House” investigation, revealed the purchase of a $7 million dollar home by then Mexican President Peña Nieto’s wife (“Aristegui Noticias” n.d.). The ownership of the home was further linked to a government contractor raising serious questions about a conflict of interest and corruption within the ruling party (“Aristegui Noticias” n.d.). The Casa Blanca investigation led by Aristegui’s team caused widespread criticism and a sharp decline in Peña Nieto’s approval ratings (Agren 2016). Beyond damage to the former President’s reputation, the investigation resulted in the cancellation of contracts related to the government contractor (“Aristegui Noticias” n.d.). The Casa Blanca investigation was a prominent instance of Aristegui’s investigative work uncovering corruption in the Mexican government deemed to be threatening to the ruling party. Her journalism has cast her as a prominent anti-corruption figure pushing for greater transparency within the Mexican government.
Aristegui’s reporting did not occur without backlash Mexican state officials. Following a 2016 investigation, Aristegui was fired from her role as a popular radio show host, MVS radio (Agren 2016). The timing coincided with her Casa Blanca investigation and she was subsequently targeted with Pegasus spyware (Rueckert 2021) Following the widely publicized and damaging investigation of property purchases by former Mexican President Peña Nieto, Aristegui and those in her inner circle began receiving text messages containing suspicious links (Chawla 2021). The messages were exploit links designed to infect the recipients’ device with Pegasus spyware. Aristegui and fellow Mexican journalists were among the first ever known journalists targeted with Pegasus around the years of 2015 and 2016 (Rueckert 2021). Forensic evidence points to a Mexican government agency as responsible for the intrusions (Ronald Deibert 2023).Carmen Aristegui, her 16-year-old son Emilio, Aristegui’s assistant, sister, and producer were all targeted in an attempt to extract the personal information of Aristegui and gain the details of those close to her (Rueckert 2021). The selection of Aristegui’s then 16-year-old son is an instance of a female journalist’s familial ties being exploited to gain control over the individual. Digital attacks directed at Aristegui also included online harassment on social media platforms. The International Center for Journalists concluded that 43% of online abuse reviewed was aimed at undermining the reputation of Aristegui, and 14% of social media threats being made against her were expressly sexist, misogynistic, or sexually explicit (Posetti et al. 2023). The case of Carmen Aristegui transcends traditional surveillance practices into the personal life of those targeted in a gendered manner. Aristegui’s case illustrates proxy targeting and family-as-leverage, in which a journalist’s intimate circle, including her minor son, became part of the surveillance surface.
Institutional Retribution – Corporal Karolina Marchlewska, Second Lieutenant Joanna Jałocha, and Klementyna Suchanow
The use of surveillance technologies extends beyond women journalists with well-documented cases against members of civil society arising out of opposition to governmental leadership and perceived threats of accountability. The former Law and Justice (PiS) ruling party of Poland were prolific users of commercial surveillance technology. They were also documented using these surveillance tools against their own citizens. The evidence for domestic spyware use arose through a Polish inquiry into Pegasus use by the PiS following their transition out of power in 2023 (Ptak 2024). A special parliamentary committee was established in 2024 after newly elected Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s promise to investigate the deployment of Pegasus against 578 individuals between 2017 and 2022 (Ptak 2024). Among those identified in the proceedings, notable targets included women reporting and opposing gender injustice across the Polish government.
In the Polish military, the story of Corporal Karolina Marchlewska and Second Lieutenant Joanna Jałocha, two former soldiers in the Military Police, reveals the utilization of invasive cyber-intelligence tools in response to reported experiences of sexual harassment occurring while serving in the military (Żemła and Wyrwal 2024). The Polish newspaper Onet first reported the surveillance against Corporal Marchlewska and Second Lieutenant Jałocha, detailing the inappropriate harassment and sexual assault of the women by commanders in the Military Police beginning in 2017(Żemła and Wyrwal 2024). Corporal Marchlewska and Second Lieutenant Jałocha filed formal allegations of abuse seeking to hold those in power accountable for misconduct, however, upon filing claims of sexual harassment the women were subjected to an onslaught of intimidation and mobbing with no findings from authorities’ internal investigations everbeing made public (Bretan 2020). The targeting led to Marchlewska being removed and Jałocha leaving the gendarmerie(Żemła and Wyrwal 2024). In 2023, the women sought justice in the Polish courts where further revelations of the abuse came to light. One technique leveraged against the soldiers after reporting instances of sexual assault was Pegasus spyware aimed at hacking their mobile devices (Żemła and Wyrwal 2024). While internal investigations largely failed to discipline those responsible for the abuse of Corporal Marchlewska and Second Lieutenant Jałocha, the organization undertook invasive surveillance efforts against the women following the allegations of sexual harassment. The use of Pegasus against Corporal Marchlewska and Second Lieutenant Jałocha was one method among many surveillance techniques used to target the soldiers as reprisal for their attempts to hold those in power accountable for misconduct.
The hacking of Polish women’s rights activist Klementyna Suchanow was also revealed by prosecutors appointed to investigate surveillance by the PiS ruling party (Ciobanu 2024; Bojakowski 2024). Suchanow is an activist who wasinvolved with organizing large protests in 2020 and 2021 in the wake of restrictions on abortion rights in the country(Ciobanu 2024). The surveillance of Suchanow coincided with the timing of the women’s rights protests. The activist faced harassment for her role in the women’s rights protests ranging from an online smear campaign to digital surveillance confirmed by the Polish special prosecutors unit. Commenting on being surveilled, Suchanow stated, “And if they used Pegasus on us, they did it not necessarily because of any investigations we were doing, but because the secret services were looking for gossip, for ‘tasty’ things from our lives – love affairs, divorces, that kind of stuff” (Ciobanu 2024) . The sentiment articulated by Suchanow is shared among women targeted with digital surveillance tools.Perpetrators attempted to gain access to the mobile devices of women in civil society with the intent of undermining the women’s adherence to gender norms they are socially expected to uphold represents surveillance and censorship methodology differing from their male counterparts. The case of Poland’s former ruling party deploying cyber intelligence tools designed to surveil the most intimate aspects of one’s life is an example of invasive surveillance methods being leveraged against women perceived as threats. The Polish cases illustrate gendered institutional retaliation: surveillance was allegedly deployed in contexts where women challenged sexual harassment, reproductive restrictions, or gendered abuses of authority.
Family Partner Leverage – Amina Mammadova
Family partner leverage is a method of gendered surveillance recorded throughout available data. Family partner leverage depicts scenarios where those associated with individuals of influence, often those perceived as threats to the state, are targets of digital surveillance technologies. The story of Amina Mammadova is one profoundly distressing example of family partner leverage. In 2020, Amina Mammadova was newly married to Ilkin Rustamzade, a leading activist in the Azerbaijani pro-democracy group Azad Genclik (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). Seven years prior, Ilkin Rustamzade was sentenced to eight years in prison for “organizing mass violent disorder” for his role organizing peaceful protests to spread pro-democracy messaging (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). Rustamzade spent six years in jail and was recognized by Amnesty International as a “prisoner of conscience” (“Political Activist’s Partner Harassed Online” 2020). Following his release, Rustamzade continued his activism on social media including urging the Azerbaijani government to provide social assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic through an online petition (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). On April 7th, 2020, Rustamzade was contacted on Facebook by an anonymous account identifying itself as an officer for Azerbaijan Special Security Services advising the activist to remove the petition. Upon Ilkin Rustamzade’s refusal to remove the post, the account threatened the humiliation of Rustamzade and his family (“Political Activist’s Partner Harassed Online” 2020). A day later, intimate images of Rustamzade’s new wife Amina, surfaced across social media and websites (“Political Activist’s Partner Harassed Online” 2020). Amina Mammadova was doxxed with the exposure of her personal information and phone numbers on an escort site. Pro-government news organizations quickly followed with headlines that “Rustamzade’s wife was not a virgin” and “Ilkin Rustamzade married a girl with a history” (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). The threats continued after Rustamzade received a second message that “If Ilkin is not silent, then what happened earlier will happen again” (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). The threats materialized with a second release of media showing Amina Mammadova with past partners and in bathing suits, a compromising image in Azerbaijan. When speaking on the targeting, Mammadova recounts negative reactions from both her family and Rustamzade’s family saying, “I was condemned for ruining the family’s reputation” (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). The pressure was so debilitating that Ilkin and Amina chose to end their marriage, a direct result of the experience “poison[ing] our relationship with each other” (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). The damage from the deeply traumatizing targeting of Amina Mammadova encompassed all areas of her life from her marriage to her psychological well-being. In the summer of 2020, Mammadova attempted suicide resulting from the public humiliation of violations into her personal life (“Political Activist’s Partner Harassed Online” 2020). It is unknown if the leaks of Mammadova images and information is correlated with Pegasus spyware; however, Ilkin Rustamzade and his father are both documented as targets of the spyware prior to 2020 leading Mammadova to suspect she was a target (Patrucic and Bloss 2021). Amina Mammadova is one of two dozen women attacked in an Azerbaijani campaign to smear critics of the government through the release of private information and character attacks framing the women as “bad wives” or “bad mothers” (Amnesty International 2021). The case of Amina Mammadova reflects broader patterns of doxing and reputational attacks as a tool to delegitimize state’s perceived threats through the exploitation of social norms. The brazen attempts to silence Ilkin Rustamzade’s activism through his wife demonstrate coercive pressure beyond primary activists and journalists to include close associations as a deliberate mechanism of control facilitated through digital targeting. Mammadova’s case illustrates family-as-leverage and sexualized morality attack directed through a spouse or partner, where the immediate victim of reputational harm was used to pressure a male activist.
Each of the cases above provides a detailed glimpse into the gendered nature of the use of Pegasus Spyware. The women in each case were attacked using privileged information gained through surveillance efforts, often the use of Pegasus spyware as part of a wider surveillance effort. The women were attacked both based a perceived essentialist nature of women’s bodies and socially constructed norms on proper behavior as defined within each states patriarchal system of power. The varying interpretations of both presentations of essentialist and socially constructed normative behaviors resulted in divergent targeting patterns and data exploitation strategies, yet the overarching gendered approach to targeting remains consistent.
Although we know of other cases in which these similar tactics were used, we don’t have a robust sense of the prevalence of these cases within the wider ecosystem of Pegasus use. More specifically we do not know the scale and scope of these types of tactics and their use against other civil society, journalists, or related actors. The next section attempts to identify the prevalence of gendered tactics of Pegasus use against women journalists and civil society actors and assess whether the use of gendered tactics is statistically more likely against men than women.
Quantifying the gendered use of Pegasus
When the Pegasus Project released its data on the extent of the use of Pegasus by state actors their dataset contained more than 50,000 names (Laurent and Rigaud 2023). The project did not make the dataset public and instead worked with a consortium of journalists and civil society actors to identify individuals targeted with this dataset. Hundreds of individuals in the dataset were identified, but many more were not. Additionally, some prominent known instances of victims of Pegasus were not included in the dataset and were instead captured by other civil society organizations and research entities such as the Citizen Lab. To test the extent to which states use Pegasus in a gendered manner we must necessarily make do with the available data. Thus, we are analyzing a non-random sample of a sample of data from a broader ecosystem of surveillance. What we have done is take as many of the publicly available disclosures of Pegasus-enabled surveillance as reported by the media and NGOs and created a unified dataset.
Dataset Construction and Model Testing
During dataset construction, organization, and analysis, the authors used Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.6 large language model to assist with several auxiliary tasks. The substantive coding of the dependent variable — the binary indicator of gender-based targeting along the four categories developed in the prior section — was performed entirely by hand by the lead author. Each of the 357 cases[1] in the analytic sample was reviewed individually against the underlying narrative evidence, source documentation, and the four-category typology; the resulting classification rests on author judgment alone. The dependent variable was hand-coded by the lead author and subsequently audited by the coauthor. Because the coding was not independently double-coded prior to reconciliation, we treat the classification as author-validated rather than formally inter-coder reliable. The LLM was used in two specific supporting capacities:
First, the LLM assisted with dataset assembly and normalization. The base dataset was compiled by the authors from the OCCRP Pegasus Project interactive database (OCCRP 2021) , Haaretz reporting on the NSO target list (Benjakob 2022) , Citizen Lab country investigations of El Salvador, Thailand, Jordan, and Armenia (Scott-Railton, Marczak, Poetranto, et al. 2022; Scott-Railton et al. 2023; Scott-Railton, Marczak, Herrero, et al. 2022) , Access Now investigations of Armenia and Jordan (Maguire et al. 2024; Krapiva, Coppi, and Hamoud 2023) , Front Line Defenders documentation of Palestinian human rights defenders (Front Line Defenders 2021) , Amnesty International’s Dominican Republic investigation (Amnesty International 2023) , and contemporaneous reporting on the Polish parliamentary inquiry into PiS-era spyware deployment (Bajak and Gera 2021) . The LLM was used to standardize country codes and country-name strings to canonical full names, to assign each case to a regional grouping for use as a regression covariate, and to reconcile minor formatting inconsistencies across source files. All standardization decisions were reviewed and approved by the authors.
Second, the LLM was used to draft replication code. A StataMP 18 do-file was developed to implement the bivariate, standard logistic, and Firth penalized logistic regression analyses; a complementary Python implementation was produced as an independent cross-check on the Stata estimation. The do-file was reviewed, modified, and executed by the authors; the Stata Firth regression reported in the main text is the primary inferential model.
Results
Women had nearly four times the odds of being classified as targeted with gender-based tactics relative to men, controlling for profession group and region (AOR = 3.88, 95% CI [1.87, 8.05], z = 3.64, p < 0.001; Firth penalized logistic regression, N = 356). The result is significant at the conventional α = 0.01 threshold, and the confidence interval excludes unity by a substantial margin. The data across all observed contexts in the dataset, suggest that women face a statistically and substantively greater likelihood than men of being subjected to family-as-leverage targeting, sexualized smear or morality attack, intimate-imagery exposure or blackmail, or gendered legal weaponization in the course of Pegasus deployments.
Among the regional controls, two effects are statistically significant. Pegasus deployments in MENA — encompassing Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Bahrain, and Jordan — show roughly three times the odds of gendered targeting relative to the Caucasus baseline (AOR = 2.88, 95% CI [1.02, 8.07], p = 0.045). This region encompasses the canonical cases of family-as-leverage operations around Jamal Khashoggi’s intimate circle, the use of Pegasus against Princess Latifa and Princess Haya in the Dubai royal household, and the recurring deployment of Article 490 and sexual-assault prosecutions against Moroccan journalists under Pegasus surveillance. The ‘Other’ regional category — composed of cases in which the operator state is uncertain, cross-jurisdictional, or has been classified by source investigators as ambiguous — shows the largest single regional coefficient (AOR = 11.87, 95% CI [1.18, 119.34], p = 0.036), although the breadth of its confidence interval indicates substantial uncertainty about the true magnitude of the effect. No other regional dummy reaches conventional significance after controls.
It should be noted that no profession stood out as subject to more gender-based targeting within our sample. This is likely due to the constrained nature of our sample reflecting a selected number of professions. If these professions were included in a larger sample of profession types, they would be more likely to be statistically differentiated. Substantively, the other category captures victims whose primary public role is not journalism, activism, law, politics, business, or academia. Instead, these individual were predominantly family members, royals, and intimate-circle figures of male principals. Its elevated coefficient is consistent with the family-as-leverage tactic concentrating in cases where the targeted individual is connected to a primary dissident rather than being independently targeted. The other profession indicators do not differ statistically from the Academic / researcher reference category, and the journalist and law-profession point estimates lie below unity. Profession-group composition, in short, does not appear to be the principal driver of gendered targeting after gender and region are accounted for.
The overall model is highly significant (Wald χ²(15) = 45.47, p < 0.001), and the female coefficient is the strongest single predictor of gender-based targeting in the data. These findings suggest that gendered tactics are not limited to isolated anecdotes. Rather, within the publicly documented case universe, they appear across multiple regions and professional categories. Because the dataset is non-random and conditioned by public reporting, the result should be interpreted as suggestive evidence of a broader structural pattern rather than a definitive population estimate. They are suggestive of a structural feature of how Pegasus and analogous mercenary spyware tools are used against women across the geography of state-deployed digital surveillance. Where prior accounts have treated gendered tactics as either anecdotal or confined to specific regional contexts, the present analysis indicates that the gender of the victim is the most consistent predictor of whether such tactics are employed.
Table 1 below shows a crosstabulation of gender and gender-based coding within the dataset. The crosstab provides descriptive evidence of a gender difference in documented gender-based targeting. Gender-based tactics were coded in 26.32% of women’s cases compared with 8.81% of men’s cases. The difference is statistically significant in the bivariate table, χ²(1) = 18.29, p < 0.001; Fisher’s exact p < 0.001. Because the dataset is non-random and based on publicly documented cases, these percentages should not be interpreted as population prevalence estimates for all Pegasus victims. Rather, they show that within the analytic sample, women’s cases are substantially more likely than men’s cases to include evidence of family-as-leverage, sexualized smear or morality attack, intimate imagery exposure or blackmail, or gendered legal weaponization.
Table 1: Gender and Gender-Based Targeting Among Pegasus Victims (N = 356)
| Gender | Gender-based targeting coded | Not coded | Total | Rate |
| Women | 25 | 70 | 95 | 26.3% |
| Men | 23 | 238 | 261 | 8.8% |
| Total | 48 | 308 | 356 | 13.5% |
Note. Outcome is the author-coded binary indicator of any gender-based targeting (family-as-leverage, sexualized smear or morality attack, intimate-imagery exposure or blackmail, or gendered legal weaponization). Rate is the row percentage of cases classified as targeted. Pearson χ²(1) = 18.29, p < 0.001; Fisher’s exact two-sided p < 0.001. Unadjusted odds ratio (women vs men) = 3.70, 95% CI [1.98, 6.91].
Table 2 below provides the statistics of a Firth penalized logistic regression predicting gender-based targeting of Pegasus victims by profession. It should be noted that no profession stood out as subject to more gender-based targeting within our sample. This is likely due to the constrained nature of our sample reflecting a selected number of professions. If these professions were included in a larger sample of profession types, they would be more likely to be statistically differentiated.
Table 2: Firth Penalized Logistic Regression Predicting Gender-Based Targeting of Pegasus Victims (N = 356)
| Variable | OR | SE | z | p | 95% CI |
| Female (vs Male)*** | 3.88 | 1.45 | 3.64 | <0.001 | [1.87, 8.05] |
| Profession (reference: Academic / researcher) | |||||
| Academic / researcher | reference | — | — | ref. | — |
| Activist / civil society / NGO | 1.28 | 1.28 | 0.25 | 0.804 | [0.18, 9.12] |
| Business / professional | 4.42 | 5.74 | 1.15 | 0.252 | [0.35, 56.27] |
| Journalist / media | 0.68 | 0.67 | -0.39 | 0.695 | [0.10, 4.67] |
| Law / legal profession | 0.22 | 0.37 | -0.89 | 0.371 | [0.0070, 6.22] |
| Other / unclear* | 5.82 | 5.95 | 1.72 | 0.085 | [0.78, 43.20] |
| Politics / government / opposition | 0.81 | 0.88 | -0.20 | 0.845 | [0.10, 6.82] |
| Constant*** | 0.07 | 0.07 | -2.62 | 0.009 | [0.0088, 0.51] |
| Observations | 356 | ||||
| Wald χ²(15) | 45.47 | ||||
| Prob > χ² | <0.001 | ||||
| Penalized log-likelihood | −101.589 | ||||
Note. Coefficients are odds ratios from a single Firth penalized logistic regression (Heinze and Schemper 2002) predicting gender-based targeting of Pegasus victims; this table presents the female and profession coefficients while the region dummies are also in the model and held constant. Outcome: binary indicator of any gender-based targeting (family-as-leverage, sexualized smear, intimate-imagery exposure/blackmail, or gendered legal weaponization). Reference categories: male, Academic / researcher (profession), Caucasus (region). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Whereas Table 2 above examined gender-based targeting by profession, Table 3 below examines gender-based targeting by region. This is likely suggestive of both differences in essentialist and socio-normative perspectives on gender and gender roles within societies. This paper does not go into the specific differentiating factors associated with regional differentiations in the patriarchal power structures based on essentialist or socio-normative factors and therefore provides no specific insights. Further research could delve into the unique gendered dynamics of surveillance in each of these regions.
Table 3: Regional Effects in Firth Penalized Logistic Regression Predicting Gender-Based Targeting of Pegasus Victims (N = 356)
| Variable | OR | SE | z | p | 95% CI |
| Female (vs Male)*** | 3.88 | 1.45 | 3.64 | <0.001 | [1.87, 8.05] |
| Region (reference: Caucasus) | |||||
| Caucasus | reference | — | — | ref. | — |
| Central Asia | 1.27 | 1.14 | 0.26 | 0.794 | [0.22, 7.42] |
| Europe | 2.78 | 2.24 | 1.27 | 0.204 | [0.57, 13.47] |
| Latin America | 1.33 | 0.70 | 0.53 | 0.594 | [0.47, 3.74] |
| MENA** | 2.88 | 1.51 | 2.00 | 0.045 | [1.02, 8.07] |
| Other** | 11.87 | 13.98 | 2.10 | 0.036 | [1.18, 119.3] |
| South Asia | 1.05 | 0.68 | 0.07 | 0.943 | [0.30, 3.71] |
| Southeast Asia | 0.10 | 0.15 | -1.54 | 0.123 | [0.0050, 1.86] |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 1.45 | 1.45 | 0.37 | 0.710 | [0.20, 10.25] |
| Constant*** | 0.07 | 0.07 | -2.62 | 0.009 | [0.0088, 0.51] |
| Observations | 356 | ||||
| Wald χ²(15) | 45.47 | ||||
| Prob > χ² | <0.001 | ||||
| Penalized log-likelihood | −101.589 | ||||
Note. Coefficients are odds ratios from a single Firth penalized logistic regression (Heinze and Schemper 2002) predicting gender-based targeting of Pegasus victims; this table presents the female and region coefficients while the profession dummies are also in the model and held constant. Outcome: binary indicator of any gender-based targeting (family-as-leverage, sexualized smear, intimate-imagery exposure/blackmail, or gendered legal weaponization). Reference categories: male, Academic / researcher (profession), Caucasus (region).
Because the parameterization of the model is large relative to the number of events we conducted a second test with a more constrained number of parameters focused only on regional differences. This second Firth test reduced the number of parameters from 16 to 9. In this reduced model, the odds ratio for women remained substantively similar and statistically significant, indicating that the main result is not dependent on the full profession-control specification.
Our case analysis in the previous section provided anecdotal evidence of gendered surveillance practices associated with Pegasus spyware. The data provided above in this section are suggestive of a gendered dynamic of surveillance. It is important to constrain our understanding of the data as the sample size is small and the and not fully representative of the wider population of Pegasus victims. As more cases occur or as more data on existing cases becomes available the robustness of these findings is likely to be tested.
Conclusion
This work started out with a central question: are gendered surveillance tactics more likely to be used against women than men? Through case and quantitative analysis our work provides suggestive evidence that women are more likely to be targeted with gendered surveillance tactics than men. These tactics manifest across dimensions as (1) family-as-leverage (2) sexualized smear or morality attack; (3) intimate imagery exposure or blackmail and (4) gendered legal weaponization. These findings are unlikely to come as a surprise to many in the human rights community or feminist scholars. Yet these findings are an attempt to quantitatively test and build on anecdotal evidence where possible. As data becomes increasingly available, we believe these findings will further strengthen our knowledge of gendered surveillance tactics and help challenge the underlying challenges facing women journalists, activists, and politicians.
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[1] One case included an anonymous individual with no identifying pronouns or other indicators to determine biological sex or self-identified gender. This case was later dropped in the analysis.